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THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE ATOM BOMB
Mary P. Lowther
Topeka, Kansas
The article discusses the reasons for the decline of the atom bomb
and nuclear warfare as a public interest issue. It is hypothesized that
the decline in public interest came at the point in history when
Americans perceived themselves to be powerless to protect themselves
against nuclear attack and therefore could no longer define the Bomb
as a traditional weapon. An historical analysis of data available
from mass media supported the hypothesis indicating that the nuclear
question has ceased to be an issue. To determine the impact of
nuclear technology today as a public issue, an attitude survey was
administered to college freshman at KU, measuring the relationship
between powerlessness towards social and political events and compla-
cency towards the growth of nuclear technology. The questionnaire
contained statements from the I-E powerlessness scale adapted from
Melvin Seeman and statements measuring complacency toward nuclear
technology constructed by the author. A Likert scale was employed.
It was hypothesized that the greater powerlessness felt by the subject
toward social and political events, the greater would be his compla-
cency toward the growth of nuclear technology. The results of the
survey indicated that the mojority of subjects did not have sufficient
preformulated opinions about nuclear technology to be complacent,
and that nuc lear technology is no longer an issue.
The atom bomb is a dead issue. It is no longer an editorial topic for local newspapers or
a conversation piece at dinner tables. It is seldom mentioned at pol itical rail ies and mayor may
not be included in national party platforms. The Bomb has ceased to be an issue except where
the effects of atomic blast become an' environmental problem. The Bomb issue died quietly around
1963. Although men such as G·:>ldwater, McNamara, and Laird have tried to revive the issue,
the American public has simply refused to renew interest in it. The Bomb may no longer be a
public issue, but as a piece of technology, the stockpile of nuclear weapons has grown in quantity
and complexity every year. In 1962, immediately before the end of the shelter craze the
Un.ited States possessed around 174 ICBMls plus 80 Polaris missiles. In 1969 the United States
had about l,0541CBM Is plus 656 Polaris missils (Bottome, 1971:120-122). It is the purpose of
this paper to probe the reasons why the Bomb issue did not flourish as well as Bomb technology.
There are at least three ways to demonstrate that the Bomb has ceased to be a public
issue. The first is a comparison of public reaction to the three" gaps" in the history of the arms
race, the bomber gap, missile gap, and deterrent gap. The bomber gap began as a belief of
many American lecders that the Soviet Union had the capability and desire to make a tremendous
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advance in production of Bison bombers so that the United States would not be able to retaliate in
event of attack. The gap began when the Soviet Air Show in July 1955 first publically displayed
the new Soviet long-range bomber. Before this time the U. 5. S. R. did not have a bomber capable
of reaching the United States. American experts predicted that the U, 50 So R, could easi Iy bui Id
up a 3-1 bomber superiority over the United States. However, at no time during the 1955 - 1956
bomber gap did the U. Su S. R, have more than 300 bombers capable of reaching the United States,
whi Ie the United States achieved a strength of 500 long-range bombers and 1,500 medium-range
ones capable of reaching the U. So S. R, with in-flight fueling (Bottome, 1971 :35-36). Americans
clearly over-reacted to what was merely a hunch.
The bomber gap anticipated the biggest myth in nuclear history, the missile gap, which
was triggered in 1957 by the successful launchings of the first Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missile and Sputnik I. Immediately after the Soviet launchings, American intelligence predicted
that the U. SoS. R. would mass-produce 1/000 to 1,500 missi les by 1961 - 1962 whi Ie the
United States would have less than 100 ICBM1s.1 The myth of the missile gap ended suddenly when
a background briefing between McNamara and Kennedy indicating that there was not nor never
had been a missile gap was made public. During the entire missile gap period the U.SoS o R,J had
at most ten ICBMls. By 1961 all rncjor news periodicals had revised their figures to give the
United States parity with the Soviet Union and even a slight advantage. The January 10th, 1963,
issue of the New York Times gave the United States a 2-1 advantage in ICBMls. American public
reaction to the bomber and missi Ie gaps bordered upon paranoia. Both gaps received wide publ icity
in the mass media. Maior periodicals, except for The Nation, accepted and propagated the missile
gap myth (Bottome, 1971:51,60). Public support of these myths encouraged great boosts in arms
expend itures.
In 1964 Goldwater, with the support of General Curtis LeMay, tried to create a campaign
issue based on the deterrent gap (also called the bomber gap of 1964). According to Goldwater,
the United States was again lagging behind in the arms race because the U. So SI,) R., through the
development of new long-range bomber, was capable of producing more long-range bombers than
the United States. But the deterrent gap did not appeal to the American people (Bottome, 1971:
85). It was not popular enough to promote Goldwoter's election, nor did it create sufficient
interest to become an important cornpqiqn issue. Clearly something had happened to make the
Bomb decline as an issue between the years 1961 and 1964.
The second way of showing that the Bomb is no longer an issue requires an examination of
the materials written concerning the Bomb since 1946. There has always been a sizable amount
of technical material published concerning the Bomb, i.e., material written by experts for
experts on such subjects as the production of and experimental developments in nuclear weaponry,
military and diplomatic policies concerning nuclear arms, economic and historical aspects of
producing nuclear weapons, legal problems concerning arms control, and the psychological and
physiological effects from exposure to radiation. The number of technical books on the Bomb
has grown proportionately with the expansion in nuclear technology (See Table 1).
Moreover, for any public issue there is a great deal of editorial or opinion material
written which makes its appeal to the average person. The number of opinion books has not
grown in proportion to the growth of nuclear technology (Table 1). The distinction between
technical and opinion books does not mean that technical books do not offer opinions or a parti-
cular bias concerning Bomb technology. Similarly the opinion books may offer a simplified
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version of technical subjects in addition to dealing with personal survival and the impact of the
Bomb upon the individual. The upsurge in opinion books in the 1959-1964 year span come main\y
from the popularity of Kennedy1s shelter program and the emphasis placed upon methods of
personal survival in case of an attack. After 1964, the number of new opinion books published
declined by 500/0 which illustrates again that the Bomb had declined as an issue.
Table 1. Frequency of publication concerning the Bomb
technica I books
opi nion books
1946-1952
50
20
1953-1958
65
36
1959-1964
126
95
1965-1970
135
44
A third indication that the Bomb is no longer an issue derives from the results of the
attitude survey administered in 1972 to measure the relationship between social and political
powerlessness and complacency concerning the nuclear status quo. The overwhelming response of
"no opi nion" to the powerlessness, and particularly to the complacency questions, illustrated that
the college students who participated in the survey has not formulated sufficient opinion concerning
the Bomb to be either satisfied or dissatisfied with the nuclear status quo. (For a more detaOi led
discussion of the measure, see the results of the attitude survey.)
To understand the nature of the Bomb as a public issue some background as to the technical
growth, public reaction, and diplomatic policies concerning nuclear weaponry is helpful. To
illustrate the public reaction concomitant with nuclear growth this section is divided into three
periods according to the nature of governmental policy: the Truman and Eisenhower administra-
tions, the Kennedy years, and the period from the inauguration of Johnson to the present.
At the end of World War II, the government relied on atomic weapons as the major
military instrument of diplomacy; this II atomic diplomacy" was felt to be the most effective way
of containing the Soviet Union (Bottome, 1971 :3). From 1945 to 1961, the United States stock-
pi led nuclear arms at the expense of more conventional weapons. The threat of atomic warfare
was presented to the public as America's sole hope for undermining the Soviet Union. Thus
atomic power was initially presented in the form of a weapon, though peaceful uses of this power
have been stressed from time to time. The pol icy of deterrence, which from 1945 to 1961 was
the mi li tory 's primary contribution to international diplomacy constituted the bulk of Arneri cci's
foreign policy.
Duri ng most of this early period the Bomb was no different from any other weapon except
that it was more powerful. The dangerous effects of fall-out did not become a serious problem
unti I about 1960, although some of the effects of radioactive fallout were known as early as
1955. The means of delivering the Bomb was similar to delivery of conventional bombs; a .
personal element was still involved in dropping the Bomb. The ICBM was not stressed until after
1957.
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Before 1955, recorded American attitudes toward the Bomb bordered on the naive and the
philosophic. There were speculations that perhaps the dropping of the Bomb on Hiroshima ushered
in a new era, an era of world-wide peace. Oile author speculated that perhaps the Bomb would
be the answer to urban crime. His thesis held that large, crime-infested cities would be dispersed
since heavi Iy populated areas would be the prime targets for atomic attack (Ogburn, 1946:269-
270). The opinion books of this period generally stressed a personal identification with atomic
energy, books such as How to Make an Atom Bomb in Your Own Kitchen and Atomic Energy for
the Layman. In this early period two trends may be seen in American attitude. The notion of
mass death was introduced for the first time, even though the Bomb was still a personalized
weapon. And the aftermath of Hiroshima resulted in the need to rationalize the moral conse-
quences of the Bomb. Nevertheless the Bomb did not become a real threat until 1955 when Russia
.developed an effective means of delivering it upon the United States.
After 1955 a good deal more of the literature on the Bomb dealt with the moral conse-
quences of nuclear warfare. While the United Stat.es was safe from attack, there was little
question of the necessity of the Bomb. For example, in the Dun Report of 1950 issued by the
Federal Courci l of Churches, America's religious leaders stated that the use of the Bomb was
necessary in Japan and would be necessary again if America had to come to the defense of her
European allies (Christian Century, 1950:1491). However, by 1955-1956 there was some question
of the necessity of dropping the original Bomb on Hiroshima (Muste, 1955: 117). The growth of
the Bomb as an issue increased proportionately to the threat of death presented to the American
people by the Soviet Union.
With the Kennedy administration (1961-1963) the strategy of a first-strike nuclear force
was relaxed and the policies of flexible response and a second-strike counterforce made a
national civi I defense program necessary. Thus the event that characterized this period was the
"shelter craze." Before Kennedy's advocation of a national shelter program there was little
recognition by the people of the dangers of actual attack. In May 1955, bombers over California
were mistaken as Russian and a real alert was sounded over Berkeley and Oakland, but a socio-
logical study of the after-effects of the alert indicated that people were not worried. In
November of 1958 air-raid warnings were accidentally set off in Washington, DoC., yet only
5% of the people sought shelter. When Kennedy persuaded Congress in 1961 to allocate $207
million for a national shelter program and civil defense, public interest in the Bomb issue rose
to its peak. Perhaps a new awareness of the Bomb insti lied a fear of death through nuclear
attack and the Bomb became personal during this period. The vague fear of death Americans
felt during the early days of the Atomic Age became specific with the Soviet threat during the
missile gap and was made an individual threat through the perceived necessity of the shelter
program. The opinion books of the shelter craze period posed problems and possibilities for
individual survival which were carried to extremes. Moral questions such as II Do you have a
right to shoot your neighbor if he tries to get into your shelter?" were posed. Books with step-
by-step survival procedures also became popular (Bongartz, 1970: 130, 202).
Two developments in the early 1960l s carried the Bomb beyond the definition of any
weapon known up to that time. First, the capacity for mass death was mechanized when ICBM
became the mojor means of delivery. The mechanizotion tended to de-personalize the Bomb.
Second, the problem of fall-out became prominent, and despite realistic appraisals of shelters
as a poor risk for survival in event of nuclear attack, the public saw in them their only solution
to nuc lear threat (Bongartz, 1970:203). However, when the facts about the inadequacy of
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shelters were emphasized in the press, the mass shelter program collapsed within two years, and
hence the de-personalization of the Bomb was complete.
Johnson's advisor, W. W. Rostow, summed up the Johnson definition of deterrence by
saying, "credible deterrence in the nuclear age lies in being prepared to face the consequences
if deterrence fails -- up to and including all-out nuclear war" (Bottome, 1971:113). Thus official
policy spoke of the possibility of war, though there was no adequate means of protection. The
United States has continued to emphasize and escalate its second-strike capacity through the
development of more Polaris missi les and an Undersea Long-Range Missi Ie System. Much of the
potential threat in the Johnson and Nixon administrations has been perceived as coming from
Red China.
In spite of increased arms escalation in the Johnson-Nixon years, the Bomb has not been
a public issue, because, it is theorized here, the public no longer conceive it as an object of
personal control. Perceived and actual control are two disti nct phenomena. Actual control of
the Bomb has always been the power of the government and the military. The source of the nuclear
myths discussed above derives from the mi litary through the mass media. The object of the myth
creations is to acquire public support for escalations in arms expenditures. Active public support
is present when the public perceives that it possesses the ability to control. Passive support
exists when weaponry control appears to be mechanized and impersonal.
Although active public interest has declined, the myth process continues. Much of the
drive that resulted in a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile system, the Sentinel, came as a result of
military claims to a Soviet ABM system, the Tallinn Line. Yet Intelligence has shown that the
Tallinn Line is actually an anti-bomber system not anti-missile. This evidence has not, however,
deterred the mi litary from perpetuating a myth about the superiority of Soviet A BM systems
(Bottome, 1971:125-130). Since the early 1950·s the military has used fear tactics to promote
public support for military expenditures, and the public has accepted these myths without exam-
ining the credibility of the statements (although many times the facts are not available). As
C. W. Mi lIs has pointed out, the American mass does not comparatively analyze the facts
avai 'ab'e through the mass media (Mi lis, 1956:313).
By its very nature as a means of national security and by its technical complexity, the
Bomb never could have been placed under public control, although the goal of the Atomic
Energy Commission when it was created in 1947 was effective civilian control. The reason people
felt they had personal control over the Bomb stemmed from the fact that traditionally, the simple
technical level of warfare has meant that the means of violence for a nation must remain decen-
tralized (Mills, 1956:178), and therefore civilian dominance over the military was feasible.
But even initially, the technology of the Bomb required management by a central authority which
was most logically the mi litary.
Yet it was not unti I the means of del ivery became impersonal and mechanized with the
ICBM that people realized that the traditional definition of a weapon was not satisfactory for the
Bomb. The Bomb ceased to be an issue not when it technically was beyond the control of the
American peopl e , but when they perceived it to be beyond their control. At the moment of this
realization, American people were powerless to deal with the Bomb. This construct of power-
lessness is a measure of expectancy; it does not depend on either the objective conditions in
society or the value of the power wielded (Seeman, 1959:784). The individual American could
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be expected to feel powerless toward the Bomb under two conditions: inability to prevent a
nuclear attack and lack of protection from a nuclear attack. The first officially came when the
United States shifted its military strategy to an emphasis on a second-strike rather than a first-
stri ke force. Lack of protection probably started to dissipate in the minds of the American people
as soon as Russia was capable of making an attack on the United States. As shown before, when
official policy advocated a second-strike force the policy for the public shifted from stress on
prevention to stress on protection via the Bomb shelter. Thus when their lack of protection was
gone too, the American people felt powerless toward the situation of the Bomb.
This feeling of powerlessness was accompanied by a complacency towards the nuclear
status quo because the always present threat of death made it a psychological necessity for people
to rationalize or minimize their fears of the Bomb. Jerome Frank cites some II escape mechanisms"
that people use today to minimize the danger (1961:361-362). One method is simply to ignore the
danger and to [ustify the action by saying, II If the attack hasn1t come yet it probably never wi II. II
The person that uses this rationalization can use the recent examples in Viet Nam, Laos,
Cambodia, and Santo Domingo where conventional weapons have been used to back his argument.
Probably the recent diplomatic recognition of Red China wi II bring even further support of this
type of rationalization. However, simply ignoring the danger does not stop nuclear stockpiling;
the potentia I threat is sti II there.
Two other escape mechanisms deal with the weapon status of the Bomb. One requires
defining the Bomb as having the effects of a conventional weapon, whi Ie permitting the Bomb to
retain its full potential against the enemy. This tactic was illustrated in an article in the
Wal·1 Street Journal in 1961 when four and a half columns were devoted to our destruction of the
U. S. S, Ro but only two columns to what damage they could do to us. The other rationalization
involves an examination of history. The development of a new weapon has always been hai led as
bringing the destruction of mankind and the Bomb was no exception (Frank, 1961:361). Thus the
rationalization is made that since none of the other weapons destroyed us, the Bomb will not
either.
The last rationalization is simply to be fatalistic about the dangers of the Bomb -- to say
to oneself that we will probably all get blown up someday. Acceptance of this rationalization is
possibly more destructive to the individual than simply ignoring the danger because whi Ie this
attitude may allay some of the immediate anxieties over the Bomb, it makes people aware of
their powerlessness toward the Bomb. W. E. Olson says that when the individual thinks he loses
his capacity to control the Bomb, then he comes to accept such things as horror and violence as
inevitable. What occurs is a casual acceptance of violence, from TV violence to napalm to
neutron' bombs (Olson, 1963:2-4). Thus probably the ultimate reason for lack of concern is not
the realization of the possibilities of mass nuclear death, but that there is nothing the individual
can do about it, and this self-perception of powerlessness merely tends to extend the individuafls
apathy to other problems.
The Bomb is currently a unique technological phenomenon. It is the first of a series of
technological developments in which escalation of its complexities has the potential for mass
death. The rapid industrial growth that has occurred since World War II could possibly bring
about more technological advancements with the consequences of death. The impact of the
growth of industrialization is tremendous. Within one lifetime atomic power became a reality,
developed, became a public issue, and died as an issue whi Ie continuing to grow in complexity.
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No other weapon or source of power in the history of mankind has made such rapid technological
progress .
The key to the powerlessness the individual feels over the situation of the Bomb lies with
his conception of personal worth in the face of mechanization. The individual feels no control
over mechanization. Thus once the technology of the Bomb reached the mechanized, push-
button warfare stage, the technical definition of the Bomb exceeded personal grasp. For nuclear
warfare to become an issue again, the issue of nuclear death m~st be redefined within a new
technological structure. For example, the nuclear test on Amchitka Island brought the Bomb into
public light again as an environmental issue. Perhaps the Bomb can once more become a public
issue if its technological definition is changed to deal with thermonuclear pollution rather than
warfare.
But even such an issue as environmental pollution may be short-lived. The problem of
environmental pollution currently parallels the early days of the Bomb development. Both the
Bomb and pollution are offspring of technology. The greatest consequences of both the Bomb and
pollution are mass death. Now the problem of pollution is bei ng stressed on a personal level.
For example, people are urged to use anti-pollutant detergents and recycle wastes. Yet the major
polluters are large industries. Not only industries control the start and stop mechanisms of
pollution, but they control the technical expertise with which to fight pollution. It is predicted
on the basis of the public reaction to the Bomb, that individuals wi II feel they no longer personally
control pollution and it, too, wi II cease to be an issue. .
A Test of the Hypothesis
The purpose of the survey was to derermi ne whether or not col lege students are complacent
about the existing nuclear status quo. Complacency is defined as the degree of satisfaction a
person feels with existing situations. Complacency toward nuclear power is the degree to which a
person is satisfied with the nuclear status quo. It is expected that a person with a high degree of
complacency toward nuclear power would feel that the growth in quantity and complexity of
nuclear weapons has taken place at a gradual rate, and that the importance of nuclear power as
a factor in international affairs is no more important than other social, political, or economic
factors. A person with a high degree of complacency 3 would also feel no personal threat from
nuc lear power and generally trusts the powers that control the status quo.
In contrast, a person possessing a low degree of complacency would tend to see nuclear
power as developing at an abnormally fast rate and playing a salient role in international affairs.
He would tend to feel that a nuclear attack is imminent if nuclear power is not checked, 4 and
would feel more compelled to keep informed about nuclear developments than a person with a
high degree of complacency.
Powerlessness, as defined by Melvin Seeman, is that category of the construct
"alienation" which expresses lithe expectancy or probability held by the individual that his
own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements he seeks"
(Seeman, 1959:784). By usi ng powerlessness as an expectancy, it can be closely related to
Rotter's "i nrernc l vs. external control of reinforcements" (Seeman, 1959:785). Consequently,
a person with a high degree of powerlessness would feel that the determination of events in
society was beyond his personal control, whereas a person with a low degree of powerlessness
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would feel that events in society were subject to personal control. The person with a low degree
of powerlessness would not only feel that his own actions could influence social events but would
also feel a personal responsibility and accountability for the actions of society. A person with
high powerlessness would attribute both the outcome and responsibi lity for society's actions to
some institution or phenomenon he feels is greater than the individual. A high degree of indivi-
dual powerlessness may be related to passive public interest discussed above, while low power-
lessness would be characteristic of active public interest.
The rationale for relating complacency and powerlessness is that a person with a high
degree of powerlessness would tend to rational ize his perception of world events (since he feels he
could do nothing personally about them) so that he is satisfied with situations as they are. A
person feeling a high degree of powerlessness toward the situation of nuclear power would tend to
rationalize his ineffectuality and express satisfaction toward the nuclear status quo.
It was hypothesized that there would be a high positive correlation between powerlessness
and complacency. People feeling a high degree of powerlessness toward the nuclear situation
would tend to rationalize their ineffectiveness and thereby would be highly complacent with the
nuclear status quo. W~th regard to factual knowledge, it is hypothesized that those people with
a low measure of complacency would be oriented to the expectancy of changing the nuclear status
quo and would, in the process of studying various possibilities for change, have acquired know-
ledge of the rncjor events and terminology in this area. Thus the individual with a high degree of
powerlessness would have a high degree of complacency toward the nuclear situation; but this
person would be less knowledgsoble regarding nuclear facts than a person with a low complacency
rate.
The subjects for the study were 110 college students in. lower division sociology classes at
the University of Kansas. The range of ages for the 45 female and 65 male participants was 17 to
31, and the majors of the participants varied' greatly.
A questionnaire consisting of 33 items was constructed to measure three areas: power-
lessness, complacency, and factual knowledge about nuclear development. The 12 powerlessness
items were adapted from the' internal vs. external reinforcement (I-E) powerlessness subscale
developed by Seeman and Neal and were answered using a 5-point Likert Scale ranging from
"strongly agree ll to II strongly disagree. II These 12 were actually six pairs of items tapping
different aspects of powerlessness. Within a pair, one item was stated as a positive expression
of power and its counterpoint as a positive expression of powerlessness. This item duplication
was done in order to evaluate inner-item reliability. The following pair of items exemplifies
the paired expressions of power and powerlessness used in the questionnaire:
I think we have adequate means of dealing with current domestic problems.
There is very little we can actually do to solve our domestic problems.
Complacency was evaluated by 14 items also in a 5-point Likert form. The related
opposites were separated and only used to achieve a measure of reliability. These items were
selected by sampling the opinions expressed by individuals and groups both with and without
technical expertise on the subject of nuclear weaponry and warfare. An example of the paired
complacency items used is the following:
The Decline of Public Concern over the Bomb
The development of the nuclear bomb in the 1960·s has had no more effect on world
affairs than any weapons would.
The development of the nuclear bomb has had tremendous impact on foreign relati ons
since 1965.
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The remaining seven items in the questionnaire were multiple-choice questions dealing with
mojor events in the history of nuclear power and current nuclear activities. It was thought that all
items could have been answered correctly with a general and continuing awareness of the nuclear
situation as presented by mass media.
Two (one set of paired items) of the complacency items and two of the powerlessness items
were not used in the analysis because they measured constructs other than complacency and
powerlessness. To decide which of the remaining items were to be used in the powerlessness and
complacency sco les, a split-half reliability, corrected by the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formulo ,
was calculated for each pair.· The criterion of .71 was used as acceptable, and all pairs with reli-
abilities of .70 or less were eliminated. Thus four (two pairs) of the powerlessness items and two of
the complacency items were deleted from the final results for lack of sufficient internal consistency.
The remaining range in the reliability of the paired items was .73 - .91. Scores for each of the
three scales were the total score obtained by summing all items included in the respective scale.
Findings
Table 2. Range of Responses on the Powerlessness and Complancey Scales and the Factual Questions
range frequency
low 8 - 18 15
powerl essness medium 19 - 28 80
high 29 - 40 15
mean 23.35 S.D. :t4.80
low 8 - 14 9
complacency medium 15 - 23 85
high 24 - 40 16
mean 19.35 S. D. t4.39
low o- 1 16
multiple choice items medium 2-5 78
high 6-7 6
mean 3.39 SoD o ±1.08
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The range for both the powerlessness and complacency scales was 8 to 40. Scores were
grouped into low, medium, and high degrees of powerlessness and low, medium, and high degrees
of complacency as indicated in Table 2. Generally, most scores tended to be in the medium or
"no opinion" range on both the powerlessness and complacency scales. The arithmetic mean for
the multiple choice items was determined, from th'e number of correct responses out of seven, as
3.39. MI')St of the subjects scored 2 - 5 correct answers out of seven, lying in the medium range
as indicated by Table 2.
The correlation between the powerlessness and the complacency scales was r =.14,
indicating a low or slight relationship between powerlessness and complacency. There was no
correlation between the degree of complacency and the number of correct responses made by each
participant on the multiple choice items.
Discussion
It was assumed in the hypothesis that whi Ie people probably would not be able to organize
or define their opinions in terms of complacency or power.lessness, their responses to the survey
items would indicate some direction in their opinions -- either a high or low degree of power-
lessness or a high or low degree of complacency toward the nuclear status quo. However I the
responses indicated confusion and a lack of direction as was evident by the large number of
.. no opinion" responses. A possible explanation for the rncjority of .. no opinion" responses on both
the powerlessness and complacency scales is
toward the issues involved. It is possible there was a problem of validity with the items of the
complacency scale, but the powerlessness items have been used previously and found to have
adequate validity. Thus, the results of the survey showed that in terms of complacency toward the
existing nuclear situation, the subjects did not care enough about nuclear warfare or weaponry to
have a pre-formulated opinion. For the mcjority of college students who took this survey the
present nuclear situation simply is not an issue. It is recognized that due to the age of the subjects
in the sample, the results of the questionnaire may not be representative of other age groups within
the population.
The lack of a correlation, r = .00, between the multiple-choice items and the items
measuring complacency bore out the lack of concern toward the nuclear issue. A significant
correlation between a high number of correct responses on the multiple choice and a low measure
of complacency would indicate a deliberate organization by the participant to become more
knowledgeable about nuclear warfare. But since nuclear power is not an issue, there is no need
to be knowledgeable.
The arithmetic mean for the powerlessness scale, 23.35, showed that the subjects do not
feel either ineffectual or personcl ly effective in dealing with the events; so that there was no
need to either recognize nuclear warfare as an issue or reationalize it. Therefore, the indif-
ference to powerlessness merely enhanced nuclear wcrfora's unimportance as an issue.
Footnotes
1Projected estimates such as these, reportedly from American intelligence, appeared in the July,
1959, issue of the Reporter end the January 12, 1959, issue of the New York Times.
Edgar M. Bottoms, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p , 156.
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2 The initial list of technical and opinion books was compiled from the Cumulative Book Index.
To verify the type of content included in the books, annotated bibliographies, book reviews, and
personal knowledge of the subject content of certain books were used by the author.
3The use of the word IIcomplacencyliwill, for the sake of brevity, refer to complacency toward the
nuclear situation unless otherwise designated. II Powerlessness" is to be limited to its social and
political usage as defined by Seeman.
4 Ev e n the person with a high degree of complacency may realize the fatality of nuclear warfare.
However, this person usually rationalizes that either warfare will not occur during his lifetime, or
if it did, there is nothing he can do about it anyway, so why worry. Generally, the highly
complacent person's fear of nuclear death is much more vague than that of the low complacency
person.
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